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1 Introduction
Does the introduction of tuition fees improve the quality of higher education? Numer-
ous voices throughout Europe support this view, stating that fees are heavily needed
to supplement public educational expenditures in order to bring funding back to inter-
nationally adequate levels (Barr, 2005, Chapter 4; European Commission, 2005; HRK,
2005). However, critics argue that enhanced access to private financing sources would
actuate a withdrawal of public funding, which would result in a poor or even zero net
effect on total educational spending.1 This fear is fuelled by recent experiences after
the introduction of tuition fees in the UK and Australia, summarized by Barr (2004,
p. 342):
If fees are set by government, rising fee income can be offset by falling
taxpayer contributions. ... Australia is a graphic example: government
introduced centrally set fees 1989 to address a funding crisis; by 2000, the
system was back in crisis. Equally, the introduction of fees in the UK did
not net any extra money.
This paper develops a simple model of higher education finance to address the ques-
tion whether the option to implement tuition fees improves the quality of university
education and to what extent crowding out of public funds occurs. This question is of
particular importance for the debate in Germany, where the ban on tuition fees was
recently abandoned by the Federal Constitutional Court and, similar to the above-
mentioned countries, fees are planned to be introduced gradually at levels determined
by the political process. As a result, higher education funding rests on both public
and private sources, an aspect typically neglected in models of university finance re-
form focussing only on the polar alternatives of pure public vs. private expenditures
(Garcia-Pen˜alosa and Wa¨lde, 2000; Wildasin, 2000; Bu¨ttner and Schwager, 2004).2
In many countries, the dispute on university reform goes hand in hand with a discus-
sion on the proper allocation of educational competencies, in particular between federal
and regional levels. From a theoretical perspective, arguments in favor of decentraliza-
tion are weak due to a variety of interregional spill-overs, including the comparability
1 Of course, the discussion on the interrelation between financing sources and quality is just one
aspect in the voluminous tuition fee debate. Other topics figuring prominently in public discussion
include lifetime redistribution, see Kupferschmidt and Wigger (2005) for a survey, and social
selectivity due to financial constraints (De Fraja, 2001)
2 Since the level of the fee is controlled by the government, our notion of ”private funding” should
not be confused with private choice on educational quality.
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of degrees (Somanathan, 1998), ability sorting (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996) or
tax competition for mobile graduates (Wildasin, 2000; Andersson and Konrad, 2003).
Therefore, we investigate how the possibility to charge tuition fees affects educational
expenditures for both centralized and decentralized decision making. Again, this has
some relevance for Germany because, unlike to Australia and the UK, fees are deter-
mined at the federal state level.
We find that the degree of decentralization matters for the effect of the availability of
tuition fees on university quality. When funding is determined by central government,
fees substitute public funds extensively without improving the quality of university
education. However, with regional decision making, per capita spending on higher
education increases when tuition fees are charged. These differences originate in the
higher elasticity of student enrolment with respect to fee increases at the regional than
at the federal level. The possibility to study in the other region limits the ability of
the regional governments to shift the financing burden of higher education to students.
This result has important implications for the assessment of educational federalism.
We argue that the option to use tuition fees can provide an argument in favor of
a decentralization of educational decisions. Our analysis identifies situations where
centralization leads to higher quality than decentralization when funding is restricted
to be only public, but decentralization performs better when tuition fees are admitted.
This finding is rooted in a distortion of the incentives to support university education
by the political process. Not attending university himself, the decisive voter recognizes
only the indirect benefits of higher education and neglects the positive direct effects
on students. This renders spending under centralization inefficient and opens up the
possibility of a better provision by decentralization even though regions are symmet-
ric. Hence, our mechanism differs significantly from Besley and Coate (2003), where a
superiority of decentralized systems originates in the heterogeneity of individual pref-
erences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic ingredients of the model.
Section 3 derives and compares spending levels under centralized and decentralized
decision making when tuition fees are banned. In section 4, this ban is abolished.
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
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2 The Model
Consider a federation formed by two ex ante identical regions i ∈ {A,B}. In both
regions, competitive firms employ labor to produce the same output good by a constant-
returns-to-scale technology. International capital mobility pegs the interest rate at the
level r for both individuals and firms. Hence, the wage per efficiency unit of labor w
is constant as well.
We focus on two subsequent periods t = 1, 2 in this economy. In period 1, there are
two generations, called the parents and the children. In each region, a mass of children
which we normalize to unity is born by P parents. In period 2, however, only the
children are alive.3 Children are heterogeneous in terms of the ability to benefit from
education, a, and the costs of moving into the other region in period 1 and 2, denoted
by µt, t = 1, 2.
4 To simplify matters, parents are assume to be immobile.
At the beginning of each period, the children are informed about their individual re-
alization of the respective mobility cost. These costs reflect not only immediate trans-
portation costs, but also non-monetary aspects of leaving a familiar environment, which
may be considered positive by some individuals. Therefore, we allow for non-positive
values of total mobility cost. For the sake of concreteness, costs are uncorrelated be-
tween periods and µt follows a uniform distribution in the interval:
[
µ
t
, µt
]
with µ
t
≤ 0.
Hence, the probability of facing a migration cost µt is 1/(µt − µt).
In addition to residence, children decide in period 1 whether to take up a study. Doing
so augments the effective supply of labor in period 2 to:5
1 + ah(e),
where a reflects the ability to benefit from higher education and h(e) is a human capital
production function with the usual properties (h′ > 0, h′′ < 0, h′(0) =∞ and h(0) = 0).
Human capital depends on total higher education expenditures or quality e = g + f ,
which consist of both public funds g and tuition fees f . Taking into account income
taxation at the rate τ and tuition cost gives lifetime net income:
3 Setting up a fully fledged overlapping generations model would complicate notation without af-
fecting the results.
4 Moving beyond the borders of the federation is ruled out to fix ideas.
5 For simplicity, we abstract from uncertainty about the success of the study. Hence, all current
students are future graduates in the model.
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IH =
(1− τ)(1 + ah(e))w
1 + r
− f.
Like Keen and Marchand (1997) and Poutvaara (2004), we treat the income tax rate τ
as fixed throughout the paper. Hence, the paper focusses on the effect of mobility on
educational and not on tax competition. We discuss this assumption in the conclusions
section.
Children not attending university supply one efficiency unit of labor in both periods.
This leads to net lifetime earnings:
IL = (1− τ)w
(
2 + r
1 + r
)
.
The ability distribution is bimodal. In each region, the number A of children is born
with a high ability to benefit from university education (a = 1), whereas the rest (1−A)
has no such talent (a = 0). Hence, the total number of talented individuals is 2A.
The decision to study results from a comparison of lifetime incomes. While untalented
individuals abstain from studying due to the opportunity cost, the talented attend
university only if:
(1− τ)w( h(e)
1 + r
− 1) ≥ f, (1)
that is, the increase in net earnings at least compensates for tuition cost. Put differ-
ently, the number of students S is only positive, if the quality of education exceeds a
minimum level e¯0(f), for which (1) holds with equality:
S =
{
A : e ≥ e¯0(f)
0 : e < e¯0(f)
. (2)
Obviously, the minimum quality increases in the tuition fee level: e¯′0(f) = (1+r)/((1−
τ)h′(e¯0)) with e¯0(0) given by h(e¯0(0)) = 1 + r.
Our welfare criterion for the comparison of different funding levels is aggregate pro-
duction by the young generation:
2S
1 + h(e)
1 + r
w + 2(1− S)w2 + r
1 + r
− 2Se.
This expression is maximized either by having no higher education at all (e = S = 0)
or all talented going to university and receiving the same quality e∗, characterized by:
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h′(e∗)w = 1 + r. (3)
This condition has the simple interpretation that the marginal returns to investment in
human and physical capital must coincide. To make things interesting, we assume that
the resulting aggregate surplus created is higher than if no-one attended university:
2A
1 + h(e∗)
1 + r
w + 2(1− A)w2 + r
1 + r
− 2Ae∗ > 2w2 + r
1 + r
(h(e∗)− (1 + r))w > e∗(1 + r). (4)
Hence, higher education is socially productive.6 Because aggregate production is con-
cave in e, social productivity obtains for all e ∈ (0, e¯] where e¯ > e∗ is implicitly defined
by (h(e¯)− (1 + r))w = e¯(1 + r).
3 Public Funding of Higher Education
This section investigates spending on higher education when all funds are public, that
is, tuition fees are not allowed: f = 0. The level of public spending results from the
political process.
Throughout the industrialized world, (potential) students make up for a minor part
of the constituency. As a consequence, public support for higher education depends
heavily on the existence of some indirect beneficial effects for the general public. While
some approaches focus on externalities (Creedy and Francois, 1990) or factor comple-
mentarities (Poutvaara and Kanniainen, 2000), we conceive public higher education as
the result of intergenerational redistribution.
We devise of a situation where political process is dominated by the parents who dispose
of two policy instruments in period 1.7 First, current tax revenues can be spent either
on a demogrant transfer b to the parents or on higher education g. Second, the parents
6 A comparison of (1) and (4) highlights the imperfect congruence between efficiency in higher
education and university attendance. For pure public funding, the talented go to university also
for inefficiently low qualities e ≥ e¯0(0). With pure private tuition, this is only true if the fee is
smaller than (1− τ)e∗.
7 There are two obvious ways to justify this assumption. First, one could assume a higher political
power of the old in the sense of a gerontocracy. Second, one could posit equal political influence,
but P > 1, such that the decisive voter is a parent. In either case, the political process leads to
results similar to Leviathan-type governments (Andersson and Konrad, 2003).
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can issue government debt D to be repaid by the children in period 2, enabling parents
to convert future tax payments into period 1 consumption. Hence, the incentive for
public spending on higher education originates in a widening of the future tax base.8
Since the transfer is uniform, earnings heterogeneity among parents plays no role in
political decisions and is therefore not modelled explicitly.
3.1 Centralization
Consider first a setting where education and debt policies are set by a central govern-
ment. Then, the government budget constraints in both periods are:
T1 +D = 2P · b+ 2S · g, (5)
T2 = D(1 + r), (6)
where period 1 tax revenues results from those children not attending university:
T1 = 2(1− S)τw,
whereas all children pay a proportional income tax in the next period:9
T2 = 2τw [S(1 + h(g)) + (1− S)] . (7)
Consolidating the budget constraints gives the net transfer to parents as a function of
educational expenditures in period 1:
b(g) =
1
2P
[
T1 +
T2
1 + r
− 2Sg
]
. (8)
Expenditures on public higher education are chosen in order to maximize (8) subject
to (2). Due to the concavity of the human capital production function, the benefit is
concave in g attaining the level 2(1 − S)τw(2 + r)/(1 + r) for both g = 0 and some
positive g˜ < e¯. Let g¯C denote the solution to the respective first order condition:
8 A similar argument could be developed in terms of pay-as-you-go pension benefits which are fi-
nanced by wage contributions. See e.g. Soares (2005) for a respective comparison between decen-
tralized and centralized education funding.
9 Additional period 1 tax payments by parents could be introduced without affecting the results.
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h′(g¯C)w =
1 + r
τ
. (9)
Then, centralized higher education spending amounts to
g¯C : e¯0(0) ≤ g¯C
e¯0(0) : g¯
C < e¯0(0) < g˜
0 : e¯0(0) ≥ g˜
Proposition 1. For all τ < 1, centralized pure public higher education is underfunded.
Proof. Inefficiency holds whenever e¯0 ≥ g¯C because e∗ > e¯0(0) > 0 from (1) and (4).
For g¯C > e¯0,
dg¯C
dτ
> 0 with g¯C = e∗ iff τ = 1. 
The parental motive to provide higher education originates in the appropriation of
period 2 tax revenues through government debt. However, aggregate output increases
by more than the tax revenue whenever the tax rate is not confiscatory. This renders
the incentives to finance university education inferior.10
Both Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte (2002) and Wigger and von Weizsa¨cker (2001) de-
velop a similar argument for public support of higher education. In Bevia and Iturbe-
Ormaexte (2002), altruistic parents are willing to forego current tax revenue in order
to finance higher education which fosters future redistribution among the offspring via
a progressive income tax. In our model, selfish parents redistribute resources to them-
selves. Wigger and von Weizsa¨cker (2001) assume that the government maximizes a
”tax dividend” in the form of future student earnings. However, they do not address the
problem of underfunding caused by an imperfect appropriation of investment returns.
Without loss of substantial insights, the subsequent analysis concentrates on the case
where the student participation constraint is not binding in the centralized equilibrium,
that is g¯C ≥ e¯0.
The conventional method of financing higher education by general taxation has often
been attacked on grounds of regressive redistribution (Garcia-Pen˜alosa and Wa¨lde,
2000). This obtains also in our model as the ratio between academic and non-academic
lifetime income among children:
1 + h(g)
2 + r
(10)
10 To simplify the analysis, we have omitted any personal effort cost of attending university. Obvi-
ously, the presence of such a cost would destroy the incentives for university education for τ = 1
such that centralized pure public education would never be efficient.
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increases monotonously in g. This is due to the fact that parents are not interested in
intra-, but intergenerational redistribution, which is promoted by fostering the earnings
of the talented children.
3.2 Decentralization
Consider now a situation where policies are chosen autonomously at regional levels.
Similar to the centralized case, parents want to maximize the net transfer to their
region:
bi(gi) =
1
P
[
T i1 +
T i2
1 + r
− Sigi
]
, (11)
where i is the regional index. However, the existence of both interregional mobility
and a fiscal equalization scheme modifies tax revenues and costs in three distinctive
ways, compared to the above section.
First, mobility in period 2 implies that not all graduates of a region will pay income
taxes in that region. Graduate earnings being the same across regions due to the
uniform income tax rate, all households with negative mobility costs move to the other
region at the beginning of period 2. As a consequence, each region collects taxes from
its period-1 residents with positive old age mobility cost µ2 and all former residents in
the other region with negative µ2. Letting S
i denote the number of graduates in i, this
region collects taxes in amount of:
TC i2 =
µ2
µ2 − µ2
τ(1 + h(gi))wSi +
−µ
2
µ2 − µ2
τ(1 + h(gj))wSj + τw(1− S), (12)
where j 6= i and the last term is due to the fact that the number of non-academics
with negative µ2 is the same in both regions.
Second, fiscal equalization drives a wedge between the taxes collected and the taxes
received by each region. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of taxes that remain in the region
of collection, revenues for i amount to:
T i2 = τδTC
i
2 + τ(1− δ)TCj2 ,
which by using (12) can be expressed as:
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T i2 = τ(1− pi)(1 + h(gi))Si + τpi(1 + h(gj))Sj + τw(1− S), (13)
where:
pi =
µ2 − δ
[
µ2 − µ2
]
µ2 − µ2
∈ [0, 1]
is a measure of the fiscal externality or ”leakage” of public investment due to graduate
mobility and fiscal equalization: Region i ends up with only the fraction 1 − pi of the
tax payments of its former students.
Third, not all talented children born in i will necessarily study at the local university.
They do so only if the individual period 1 mobility cost exceeds the earnings differential
between regions:
µ1 ≥ (1− τ)w[h(gj)− h(gi)]/(1 + r), (14)
where (14) suppresses solutions boundary to simplify the exposition by presuming that
both gi and gj exceed e¯0(0) . Using the properties of the distribution of µ1 gives the
number of children born and studying in i:
Sii =
S
µ1 − µ1
·
[
µ1 − (1− τ)w
h(gj)− h(gi)
1 + r
]
, (15)
where the subscript refers to the region of origin and the superscript to the region of
study. Accordingly, the number of students in i originating from j is 1− Sij, such that
the total number of students in i becomes:
Si = S
[
1 + 2
(1− τ)w
µ1 − µ1
h(gi)− h(gj)
1 + r
]
.
Obviously, educational quality attracts students:
∂Si
∂gi
= 2S
(1− τ)w
µ1 − µ1
h′(gi)
1 + r
> 0,
∂Sj
∂gi
= −2S (1− τ)w
µ1 − µ1
h′(gj)
1 + r
< 0.
At last, all children not attending university get the same period 1 income in both
regions. Accordingly, only those with negative mobility cost move. Since the inter-
regional net flow of non-students is zero, period 1 tax revenue is independent of the
degree of educational federalism: like in period 2, each region has (1−S) non-academic
resident children.
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Therefore, the problem of the parents in region i is to maximize (11) with respect to
gi, subject to (13) and (15), taking gj as given. This gives the first order condition:
∂bi
∂gi
= Si
[
(1− pi)τwh′(gi)− (1 + r)
]
(16)
+
∂Si
∂gi
[
− gi(1 + r) + τ(1− pi)(1 + h(gi))w
]
+ piτ(1 + h(gj))w
∂Sj
∂gi
≤ 0.
with equality if gi ≥ e¯0. The respective second order condition:
∂2bi
∂(gi)2
= Si(1− pi)τh′′(gi) + 2∂S
i
∂gi
[−(1 + r) + τ(1− pi)h′(gi)w]
+
∂2Si
∂(gi)2
[−(1 + r)gi + τ(1− pi)(1 + h(gi))w] < 0, (17)
is assumed to be fulfilled. This can be ensured by a sufficiently low sensibility of
location choice with respect to quality differentials.11
According to (16) improving local educational expenditures has three effects. First, it
affects the difference between marginal tax revenues and cost for all actual students.
Second, it attracts additional students who generate both tax revenue and cost. And
third, the reduction of students in the other region impinges on tax revenues to the
extent of fiscal leakage.
We concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where gi = gj, Si = Sj = S, and ∂S
j
∂gi
=
−∂Si
∂gi
. Therefore, the equilibrium spending level in both regions is either g¯D solving:
Ω¯D =
[
(1− pi)τh′(g¯D)w − (1 + r)]
+2
(1− τ)w
µ1 − µ1
h′(g¯D)
1 + r
[
τ(1− 2pi)(1 + h(g¯D))w − g¯D(1 + r)] = 0, (18)
if g¯D ≥ e¯0 or is zero otherwise.
In what follows, we assume that the equilibrium has the property ∂
2Ω¯D
∂(g¯D)2
< 0.12 Oth-
erwise, a higher opportunity cost of higher education in form of an increased interest
rate would be conducive to public spending in the absence of fiscal externalities:
dg¯D
dr
∣∣∣∣
pi=0
= −
−1− 2 (1−τ)h′(g¯D)w
(µ1−µ1)(1+r)2
τ(1 + h(g¯D))w
∂2Ω¯D/∂(g¯D)2
.
11 If µ1 − µ1 is sufficiently high and attracting students increases b (τ(1−pi)w[1+h(gi)w] > (1+r)gi),
τ(1− pi)h′(gi)w > 1 + r must hold due to (16), rendering all terms in (17) are negative.
12 Again, this is always the case if the increase in local enrolment due to rising quality is not too
intense.
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Proposition 2. Under decentralized pure public funding, educational spending de-
creases in the fiscal externality for pi ∈ [0, p¯i]. There is no regional provision of higher
education if pi ∈ [p¯i, 1]. Educational quality is higher than under centralization if pi < p˜i,
with p¯i < p˜i < 1/2.
Proof. By use of the implicit function theorem:
dg¯D
dpi
= −
−τh′(g¯D)− 4τ(1 + h(g¯D)) (1−τ)w2
(µ1−µ1)(1+r)
∂2Ω¯D/∂(g¯D)2
< 0,
whenever (18) characterizes the equilibrium. Moreover, all terms in (18) are negative
for pi = 1, and hence g¯D = 0. For pi = 0, instead, (18) becomes:[
τh′(gD)w − (1 + r)]+ 2 (1− τ)w
(µ1 − µ1)(1 + r)
[
τ(1 + h(gD))w − gD(1 + r)] = 0. (19)
By (9), (19) can only be fulfilled for g¯D > g¯C . Because g¯D is continuous in pi, there
must be a level p˜i for which g¯D = g¯C , and a threshold p¯i for which the participation
becomes binding, with p˜i < p¯i due to g¯C > e¯0. Hence, g¯
D falls to zero for pi > p¯i. For
pi = 1/2, the second column in (18) is negative, implying g¯D < g¯C as the first row
would also become negative for the level g¯C . 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition. While the negative relation between perceived
marginal return and higher educational investment is straightforward, the relative per-
formance of decentralization is easily explained in terms of the strategic interrelation
between spending levels. From the reaction function (16):
dgi
dgj
=
−1
∂2bi/∂(gi)2
[
∂Si
∂gi
(τw(1− pi)h′(gi)− (1 + r)) + ∂S
j
∂gi
piτwh′(gj)
]
. (20)
The sign of this expression equals the sign of the square bracketed term in the nu-
merator, which captures the basic educational tradeoff faced by each region. On the
one hand, it has an incentive to attract students (and later taxpayers) by providing a
better quality than the competitor. This creates a strategic complementarity between
local educational expenditures. On the other hand, there is also a substitutability be-
cause each region can free ride on the expenditures of the other region by relying on
fiscal equalization and the immigration of some graduates. The relative importance
of these effects is determined by the extent of the fiscal externality. If for example
pi = 0, regions appropriate all later tax revenues of local students and engage in a
Educational Federalism and Tuition Fees 12
fierce competition for students leading to expenditures above the centralized level.13
Algebraically, (20) is positive and strategic complementarity prevails.14 In the other
polar case pi = 1, however, own educational investments would only benefit the other
region. Therefore, an intermediate level of fiscal leakage exists for which centralization
and decentralization yield identical quality.
This result puts some caution on the popular finding that decentralized education
policies are inferior to centralized ones. Both Justman and Thisse (1997) and Del Rey
(2001) establish a respective result based on the mobility of graduates, but neglecting
any beneficial effects of attracting students to a region. In a model with student mo-
bility only, Bu¨ttner and Schwager (2004) find educational expenditures to be strategic
substitutes. However, this result hinges on the assumption that each region cares for
the earnings of all its citizens wherever they reside. Obviously, this downplays the fiscal
effect of graduates remaining abroad.15 Bailey et al. (2003) present some empirical ev-
idence that competition among US state universities reduces educational spending. In
a model calibrated to the US where public education can be supplemented by private
purchases, Soares (2005) finds large welfare gains from shifting from community-wide
to nation-wide funding.
In contrast, Gradstein and Justman (1995) have shown that decentralization raises
spending levels. However, their argument is set up in terms of human capital invest-
ment of immobile residents in order to attract mobile physical capital. In our model,
educational spending is used to attract students and their future tax payments. More-
over, decentralized spending is excessive in Gradstein and Justman (1995) because - in
contrast to our model - centralization would be efficient.
Nevertheless, centralization leads to higher expenditures than decentralization in a
number of cases, including pi = 1/2 which reflects a situation without graduate mobility
(µ
2
= 0), but full fiscal equalization (δ = 1/2). Moreover, the fiscal externality can
even preclude a decentralized supply of higher education, although centralized provision
would exist (pi > p˜i).
13 With the results at hand, we can not exclude the possibility of inefficiently high provision, as the
equilibrium condition h′(g¯D)w ≤ (1+r)/τ is not incompatible with g¯D > e∗. However, Proposition
4, to be derived at a later stage, implies that decentralization leads unambiguously to underfunding.
14 The sign of (20) for pi = 0 follows from (16) recognizing that the per student tax revenue is positive.
15 Moreover, the opposite result obtains under that regional target function once mobility is restricted
to graduates, see Justman and Thisse (2000).
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4 Allowing for Tuition Fees
We now consider a setting where higher education can be financed by both public
and private funds. In line with recent real-world reforms, we posit that the level of
tuition fees is set by the government. Since all individuals have access to the perfect
capital market and educational success is certain, the well known problems of wealth-
biased demand for privately funded education are absent and require no further state
intervention.16
4.1 Centralization
Using the relation e = g + f , the problem of the parents is to maximize:
b =
1
2P
[
T1 +
T2
1 + r
− 2S(e− f)
]
, (21)
with respect to e and f subject to student participation (e ≥ e¯0(f)), tax revenues in
period 2 being:
T2 = 2τw [S(1 + h(e)) + (1− S)] . (22)
Public funding results as the difference between total and private expenditures.
Proposition 3. Under centralization, the availability of tuition fees leads to a with-
drawal of public funding. Tuition fees do not improve educational quality.
Proof. The first order condition of maximizing (21) with respect to e is:
h′(e)w =
1 + r
τ
, (23)
which is solved by g¯D. Moreover, g¯D is feasible for f = 0. However, for any given e, (21)
increases monotonously in f as long as e ≥ e¯0(f). Therefore, the maximization of (21)
results for e = g¯C = e¯0(f
C) and gC = g¯C − fC . The proposition follows immediately
from comparison with the case f = 0. 
Since the marginal return and cost of total higher education have not changed, tuition
fees have no impact on the quality preferred by parents. However, the fees serve to
shift the financing burden towards students as long as their participation is ensured.
16 As pointed out by Garcia-Pen˜alosa and Wa¨lde (2000), the precise form of fee repayment facilities
matters for student risk taking under uncertainty. See Poutvaara (2004) for an extension of the
analysis of tuition fee designs to the presence of graduate mobility.
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Therefore, there is full crowding out of public funds by fees up to the point where the
talented become indifferent towards educational choice as illustrated by Figure 2.
As a consequence, the model provides some support to the assertion that allowing for
state regulated tuition fees is not conducive to the quality of higher education. The
next section investigates to what extent this argument applies to decentralization.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
4.2 Decentralization
With regional decision making, tuition fees affect the location choice of students. A
talented child born in i will go to university in the region of birth only if the migration
cost exceeds the earnings differential net tuition cost differentials between i and j:
µ1 ≥ (1− τ)w
1 + r
[
h(ej)− h(ei)]− [f i − f j] .
Therefore, the total number of students in region i becomes dependant on qualities
and fees:
Si = S
[
1 +
2
µ1 − µ1
(
(1− τ)w[h(ei)− h(ej)]
1 + r
+ f j − f i)
)]
,
and an increase in quality increases local enrolment, whereas a higher fee is deterrent:17
∂Si
∂ei
= S
(1− τ)w
µ1 − µ1
h′(ei)
1 + r
> 0,
∂Si
∂f i
=
−S
µ1 − µ1
< 0.
Under these premises, parents in each region maximize:
bi =
1
P
[
T i1 +
T i2
1 + r
− Si(ei − f i)
]
, (24)
with respect to ei and f i, considering student participation and the tax revenue:
17 These ceteris paribus effects have to be disentangled from the question how tuition fees affect
enrolment if they supplement public funding. This effect amounts to:
∂Si
∂ei
+
∂Si
∂f i
= S
(1− τ)wh′(ei)/(1 + r)− 1
µ1 − µ1
R 0.
and is positive (negative) if public funding is sufficiently low (high).
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T i2 = τw(1− pi)(1 + h(ei))Si + τwpi(1 + h(ej))Sj + τw(1− S).
The resulting first order conditions are:
∂bi
∂ei
= Si
[
(1− pi)τwh′(ei)− (1 + r)
]
+
∂Si
∂ei
[
(f i − ei)(1 + r) + τ(1− pi)(1 + h(ei))w
]
+ piτ(1 + h(ej))w
∂Sj
∂ei
≤ 0 (25)
∂bi
∂f i
= (1 + r)Si +
∂Si
∂f i
[
(f i − ei)(1 + r) + τ(1− pi)(1 + h(ei))w
]
+piτ(1 + h(ej))w
∂Sj
∂f i
≤ 0. (26)
The interpretation of (25) is analogous to (16). Regarding tuition fees, each region
trades off the reduction in public spending with the financial consequences of deterring
students to the other region.
As a consequence, the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by:
bie = −(1 + r) + τ(1− pi)h′(e) (27)
+2S
(1− τ)h′(e)
(µ1 − µ1)(1 + r)
[(1 + r)(f − e) + τ(1− 2pi)(1 + h(e))w] ≤ 0
bif = 1 + r − 2S
1
(µ1 − µ1)
[(f − e)(1 + r) + τ(1− 2pi)(1 + h(e))w] ≤ 0. (28)
Under the same assumptions as with pure public funding, bi is concave in ei. Moreover,
bi is unambiguously concave in f i. In what follows, we consider the global optimality
condition ∂2b
i
∂ei2
∂2bi
∂f i2
>
(
∂2bi
∂ei∂f i
)2
as fulfilled.
The following lemma provides a useful insight in terms of the characterization of the
equilibrium.
Lemma. No symmetric equilibrium violates the student participation constraint.
Proof. Suppose both regions choose e and f such that the student participation
constraint is violated. Then, each talented pays taxes in amount τw(2+r)/(1+r) from
his non-academic occupation. A unilateral move to a policy (e, f) such that e = e¯0(f)
changes the regional payoff according to: τ(1+h(e))w
1+r
− e + (1−τ)(h(e)−1)w
1+r
− τw 2+r
1+r
=
(h(e)
1+r
− 1)w − e. This expression is positive whenever higher education is socially
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productive: (ah(e) − 1)w > e. Since socially productive e always exist, there is no
equilibrium where both regions violate the student participation constraint. 
Each region has an incentive to provide some university education when all student
rents are extracted by tuition fees. Hence, unlike in the pure public funding case, the
nonexistence of higher education under decentralization is not an issue.
Consequently, two possibilities for a symmetric equilibrium remain: tuition fees can be
either zero or positive, both with positive student demand. We label positive fees for
which the student participation constraint is not binding as moderate.
Proposition 4. A symmetric equilibrium with moderate tuition fees under decentral-
ization is characterized by:
h′(eD)w =
1 + r
1− τpi . (29)
The utilization of tuition fees improves higher education quality. However, total spend-
ing is inefficiently low.
Proof. (29) follows immediately from equating (27) and (28). Moreover, from (27):
de
df
= −2S(1− τ)wh
′(e)
(µ1 − µ1)
∂2bie
∂e2
> 0.
Hence, total quality chosen according to (27) is the higher, the higher the fees. Under-
funding follows from h′(eD) > h′(e∗) by comparing (29) and (3).
The positive effect of tuition fees on overall quality arises from their regional deter-
rence: A regional substitution of tuition fees for public funds on a one-to-one basis
would provoke some talented children to move away. In order to avoid this, there is
no full crowding out of public funds. As a consequence, equilibrium quality under
decentralization is higher for moderate fees than if they were banned. These results
notwithstanding, there is no full resolution of the underfunding problem.18
Moreover, the above finding begs the question whether tuition fees will be introduced
at all. By (28), this is the case if the marginal return of increasing f i is positive for
f i = 0, ei = g¯D:
18 Since total expenditures in the presence of fees are at least as high as without fees, one can conclude
that decentralized pure public funding leads to underprovision as stated above.
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dbif
df
∣∣∣∣∣
f=0,
e=g¯D
= −(1 + r) + τ(1− pi)h′(g¯D) (30)
+2S
(1− τ)h′(g¯D)
(µ1 − µ1)(1 + r)
[−(1 + r)g¯D + τ(1− 2pi)(1 + h(g¯D))w] > 0,
which by using (18) is equivalent to:
h′(g¯D)w >
1 + r
1− τpi . (31)
This condition is the more likely met, the higher the financial gains from introducing
fees, that is, the lower the preexisting level of public funding and the higher the marginal
productivity of given expenditures. A higher tax rate, however, has a negative impact,
as it mitigates the problem of pure public underfunding and increases the marginal
revenue loss due to student deterrence. Accordingly, the effect of the fiscal externality
on the incentives to introduce fees is ambiguous. Here, the marginal cost of student
mobility decreases in quality because tax revenues are concave in e. However, the
wedge between efficient and pure public funding is increased.
We are now in the position to compare the performance of centralized and decentralized
educational competencies. As a first result:
Proposition 5. For moderate tuition fees, decentralized education leads to higher
quality than centralized education if the fiscal externality is sufficiently low.
Proof. Comparing (18) and (29) gives eD ≷ g¯D ⇐⇒ pi ≶ (1 + r)(1− τ)/τ.
Like under pure public funding, decentralization provides better teaching quality than
centralization when the fiscal externality is sufficiently low. However, this threshold
value is affected by the availability of tuition fees.
Proposition 6. When tuition fees are available, decentralization leads to higher
educational expenditures than centralization for pi < ˜˜pi, p˜i < ˜˜pi.
Proof. Since fees do not decrease total spending, eD > g¯D for all pi < p˜i. For pi = p˜i,
decentralization implies higher total expenditures than centralization when fees are
introduced. Therefore, p˜i < (1 + r)(1− τ)/τ must hold. Moreover, (31) is fulfilled for
p˜i: h′(g¯D) = (1 + r)/τ > (1 + r)/(1 − τ p˜i)). By continuity, there must be pi > p˜i for
which eD > g¯D. 
Regions face an incentive to introduce fees for the level of the fiscal externality equal-
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izing centralized and decentralized expenditures under pure public funding. Then,
decentralization must provide a higher quality, because total expenditures increase in
f . Figure 3 illustrates.
This finding has consequences for the proper allocation of educational responsibilities.
Corollary. With pure public education, decentralization leads to higher welfare than
centralization for pi < p˜i. When tuition fees are allowed, decentralization delivers higher
welfare for pi < ˜˜pi.
Proof. follows from Proposition 6 and the fact that decentralization never leads to
excessive funding. 
Hence, educational federalism matters for the quality of universities, with the avail-
ability of fees strengthening the case for decentralization. For any fiscal externality
pi ∈ [p˜i, ˜˜pi], the availability of tuition fees makes the welfare superior system the cen-
tralized rather than the decentralized one.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the quality effects of state regulated tuition fees depend
crucially on the degree of educational decentralization. We show that such fees do
not improve total expenditures when educational decisions are centralized, a result in
line with recent experiences in Australia and the UK. However, federal competition
precludes a similar development under decentralized decision-making and tuition fees
contribute to the quality of higher education. Therefore, the availability of fees can
make a shift from a centralized to a decentralized system of university finance worth-
while. Unfortunately, reliable empirical evidence on the quality implications of tuition
fees in countries with decentralized higher education is currently not available.
As it stands, the model has used a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we have
developed our arguments in the context of a two period setup rather than in a model
of overlapping generations. The latter would complicate the analysis but leave the
general results unaffected. The most serious modification would be the consideration
of parental mobility, responding to benefit differentials across regions. While the con-
comitant increase in the number of benefit recipients would diminish the gains from
quality enhancements, the higher caution of decentralized decision makers in substi-
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tuting tuition fees for public funding would not be affected.
Second, we have concentrated on symmetric equilibria under decentralization. Cer-
tainly, the possibility of regional disparities, possibly produced by differences in re-
gional endowments, requires further investigation. However, it should be stressed that
heterogeneity affects both decentralized and centralized decisions (Besley and Coate,
2003).
Third, we have assumed that all students have the same ability to benefit from higher
education. With heterogenous abilities, tuition fees would affect the size and the pro-
ductivity of the student body, as the marginal student would refrain from attending
university. To the extent that this reduces tax revenues, parents would want to com-
pensate for this by providing a higher quality. Hence, crowding out of public funding
under centralization would be less severe than the above analysis suggests. However, as
parents face an analogous incentive also at the regional level, no qualitative difference
to the above findings can be expected.
And fourth, we have not addressed the issue of regional tax competition. A number
of studies has shown that the strive for mobile graduates puts a downward pressure
on regional taxes, see e.g. Anderson and Konrad (2003). As a consequence, incentives
to provide pure public education under decentralization are reduced. However, the
effects in the presence of tuition fees are not straightforward. First, a lower tax rate
slackens the student participation constraint for given expenditures and fees. Second,
tax competition can be mitigated as fees make up for a financing source independent
of future student residence. And third, the fundamental difference in incentives to
substitute public funds for tuition fees derived above still applies. In general, we expect
that the overall result depends on the division of educational and tax responsibilities
between local and federal governments, an issue that we leave for future research just
like the related question whether results could be improved by university autonomy.
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Figure 2: The level of centralized public funding with and without tuition fees
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Figure 3: Centralized vs. decentralized education with tuition fees
